Two public pushes for peace talks this month, changes in Frelimo and the insurgents, and a more public recognition that the Cabo Delgado war will continue indefinitely may be slowly changing the mood within government toward some sort of talks with Cabo Delgado insurgents.
Yesterday the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) hosted a briefing by Mozambican journalist Borges Nhamirre which pushed harder on the ISS December 2025 Policy Biref “Inclusive dialogue: a priority for resolving the Cabo Delgado insurgency”. In today’s briefing Nhamirre stressed that dialogue is essential to ”identify grievances and conflict drivers, rebuild trust,” and create the conditions for formal negotiations. But he warned that today, “no dialogue is happening” and the government does not support informal contacts.
And a publication this month by three Mozambican security experts with extensive knowledge of Cabo Delgado says “it is possible to engage in dialogue and negotiations“ with the insurgents. They are Salvador Forquilha, João Pereia and Emílio Zeca, who are part of a newly formed NGO, the Tibverane Foundation, founded with Swiss funding and Mozambique government support.
Both stress the importance of starting with the roots of the insurgency – lack of jobs, political and economic exclusion particularly affecting Muslim communities, abuse by security forces, and control from Maputo instead of locally.
Nhamirre stresses the importance of changes within Frelimo and government. The previous president Filipe Nyusi was from Cabo Delgado and was put into the job by the powerful Frelimo Makonde elite there. It was said he did their bidding, in particular trying to win the war militarily and not negotiate. The current president Daniel Chapo grew up in Beira, Sofala, in the centre of the country, which has a very different elite which often does not follow the line set in Maputo. All three authors of the Tibverane paper are also from Beira. África Monitor Intelligence (13 July) says Pereia is close to Chapo and was chosen by the President to be director of Tibverane. Nhamirre reports that the Makonde have lost substantial power in Frelimo and the government, with few ministers, and Chapo has more space for movement.
The final change has been on the ground. At the start of the war a decade ago, the insurgents showed their power by beheading local villagers. This stopped as the insurgents learned the importance in any guerilla war of ‘winning hearts and minds’. Thus there is an accommodation between insurgents and local people across much of Cabo Delgado. Internally displaced people are now returning to their villages, in part because of poor conditions in the camps for the displaced, and in part because they fear the Mozambique security forces more than the insurgents.
The other change is the realisation in the international community that the civil war will continue indefinitely. It has already been agreed that the entire gas liquification process will be inside a fortress on the Afungi peninsula (near Palma) with access only by sea and air, but not by land. The Afungi fortress concept assumes that the war continues outside the walls. And on 10 July TotalEnergies announced an entire new security ring surrounding the Afungi fortress with an electrified fence and 120 cameras . At the same time it delayed the building in South Korea of 17 LNG tankers, already delayed from a planned delivery in 2023. The new delivery date is 2030, and LNG cannot start without boats to take it away. And Japanese ambassador Keiji Hamada announced on 23 July that Japan would stop giving aid for reconstruction because the ‘instability’ makes it impossible to do infrastructure construction. This harsh judgements comes from one of the oldest and most loyal aid donors, who see no end to the war. Humanitarian aid for those affected by the war will continue, he said.
The involvement of the Swiss is important and there needs to be more coordinated support from donors, There are at least six NGO and INGO attempts to push for negotiations, but all are small and they do not cooperate because they are all fighting for the limited pool of donor money.
Despite the UK’s virtual withdrawal from Mozambique, there is one thing it could still do. Tony Blair was in Maputo 20 July and met with Chapo who apparently asked for military support. More useful would be for the UK to provide help from Jonathan Powell, Prime Minister Andy Burnham’s National Security Adviser. He was chief British negotiator in the successful peace settlement in Northern Ireland, and has worked in Mozambique. He was also Chief of Staff to Blair when he was Prime Minister, so Powell’s assistance might be via the Blair Foundation which is present in Mozambique. Powell wrote the excellent 2014 book Talking to Terrorists: How to End Armed Conflicts which should be read by NGOs, government and donors involved in this war – it is available on Kindle.
And it should be remembered that at the end of the Proxy War there were peace talks in Rome (July 1990 to October 1992) with Renamo which led to elections and some “terrorists” becoming members of parliament.
+ Borges Nhamirre, ‘Dialogue initiatives for peacebuilding in Cabo Delgado, slides, ISS, 27 July 26 https://bit.ly/ISS-Nhamirre-CdG
+ Borges Nhamirre, ‘Inclusive dialogue: a priority for resolving the Cabo Delgado insurgency, ISS, 3Dec25 https://bit.ly/ISS-dialogue-Dec25
+ Tibverane, (9 Mb) ‘Is it possible dialogue and negotiate with al-Shabaab?’ https://university.open.ac.uk/technology/mozambique/sites/www.open.ac.uk.technology.mozambique/files/TIBVERANE_POLICY_PAPER_02_06_2026 Is dialogue possible.pdf
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