Observers increasingly believe that the recent events in #GuineaBissau were, in reality, a scheme to prevent a peaceful alternation of power.
Whether orchestrated from inside the civilian leadership or executed by military actors acting with political allies, the impact is the same: the interruption of the constitutional order at a decisive moment in the electoral process.
Both the Lomé Declaration (2000) and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (2007) define and condemn any act—civilian or military—that subverts the democratic process, obstructs the expression of the popular will, or impedes the transfer of power. The key here is the result, not the identity of the orchestrators: if the constitutional process is derailed, then there is an Unconstitutional Change of Government. ECOWAS CEDEAO & the #AUPSC did the right thing by suspending Guinea-Bissau from participating in their activities (communiqués of the #ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council and of the PSC, on 27 & 28 November 2025, respectively).
In addition to maintaining the suspension and the non-recognition of any authority that emerged from these events — the baseline under the Lomé Declaration and #ACDEG, and consistent with ECOWAS, which, in its communiqué, “rejects any arrangements that perpetuate the illegal abortion of the democratic process and the subversion of the will of the people of Guinea-Bissau” — the AU and ECOWAS should:
b) Initiate an independent, time-bound investigation to establish the full chain of responsibility. If elements of the outgoing leadership colluded with the military to block an opposition victory, this must be clearly documented.
c) Pursue targeted sanctions—travel bans, asset freezes, and restrictions on public office—against individuals found to have engineered or facilitated the scheme. AU instruments explicitly allow for accountability of civilian actors, not only putschist officers.
d) Secure a credible pathway back to constitutional order, by protecting the relevant institutions and ensuring the transparent conclusion of the electoral process.
e) Coordinate closely with the #UN and other key stakeholders within and outside Africa, to ensure that sanctions and diplomatic pressure are effective. In this respect, and as an urgent step, the AU and ECOWAS may wish to establish an international contact group, in collaboration with the UN. The AUPSC communiqué already provides a basis for this.
Guinea-Bissau is a reminder that today’s UCGs are increasingly complex and take different forms. But the AU’s framework was designed precisely for such scenarios. The real challenge is not the absence of norms, but the need for consistent and determined implementation — as I discuss in my working paper « The African Union and Coups: Why Implementation Matters More Than New Norms », published last June by PRIF Peace Research Institute Frankfurt. Countering the current wave of UCGs & preserving democratic gains require nothing less.
