Jerry Maquenzi
On April 16, 2026, the President of the Republic of Mozambique, Daniel Chapo, embarked for Beijing on a seven-day state visit, at the invitation of his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping. The agenda was dense: mobilization of financing for structuring projects, deepening of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the two countries, and opening doors to Chinese investment in the infrastructure, energy and mining sectors. During the visit, Chapo toured Chinese provinces, personally visited the headquarters of Western Mining Group and the mining company Qinghai Copper Industry, and in Xining chaired a roundtable on Mozambique-China development and investment (Xinhua Português, 21/04/2026). The tone was that of someone who arrives with a new proposal, with an opportunity yet to open, with an invitation yet to be accepted.
But there was a problem with this narrative. A problem with data, with numbers, with signed licenses, stamped and in force long before the presidential plane took off for Beijing.
The data from the prospecting and research licenses in force in Cabo Delgado Province, referring to the year 2025, the first year of Daniel Chapo’s government, tell a very different story from the one that was shown in the diplomatic corridors of the Chinese capital. They tell the story of a presence that did not need an invitation because it was already installed. They tell the story of critical minerals: graphite, nickel, copper, vanadium, titanium, whose control was already, in alarming proportions, in totally or partially Chinese hands. In short, they tell the story of a diplomacy that came late to formalize what the economy had already decided.
This article analyzes the data on prospecting and research licenses in force in Cabo Delgado, crosses them with the agreements signed during the presidential visit to China, and argues that the “invitation” speech serves, in practice, as a diplomatic curtain for a reality that official records already confirmed: Mozambique was opening its underground to Chinese strategic interests even before announcing it to the world.
- Cabo Delgado as Epicenter of the Race for Critical Minerals
To understand what is at stake, it is first necessary to understand what Cabo Delgado is in the context of the global geopolitics of natural resources. Mozambique’s northernmost province, which has been plagued for years by an armed conflict that has displaced more than a million people and paralyzed large-scale energy projects, is also one of the areas with the highest concentration of strategic minerals in all southern Africa.
Under its soil there are significant reserves of graphite, Mozambique is one of the world’s largest producers of this mineral, as well as deposits of nickel, copper, vanadium, titanium, zircon and rutile. All these minerals share an essential characteristic in the current economic context: they are indispensable for the global energy transition. Graphite is the main component of lithium-ion battery anodes (Lima, 2015), which power electric vehicles, mobile phones and renewable energy storage systems. Nickel and copper are equally crucial for the manufacture of batteries (Metalurgia, 19/08/2021), electric motors, wind turbines and high-voltage transmission cables. Vanadium is used in large-capacity flow batteries (Wikipedia, 28/02/2026). Titanium is essential in the aerospace industry and in high-tech equipment (Wikipedia, 08/02/2026).
In an era in which the race for critical mineral supply chains has replaced, in many ways, the oil rush of the twentieth century, Cabo Delgado has become a chessboard where the great powers play their pieces, not always in a visible way, not always with the knowledge of the general Mozambican public.
China understood this chessboard long before others. And the data shows that he did not wait for any summit to start playing.
- The License Map: What the Data Reveals
The database of prospecting and research licenses in force in Cabo Delgado registered, in the period under review, a total of 107 active licenses collected on the Mozambique mining cadastre portal, covering a wide range of minerals, from precious stones such as ruby, aquamarine and tourmaline, to industrial metals and minerals critical to the global green economy.
A careful analysis of the mineral composition of these licenses reveals an unambiguous pattern (see the table below):
- Graphite appears in 45 licenses, which corresponds to 1% of the total, making it the most frequent mineral in the province’s entire licensing portfolio, surpassing even gold (present in 32 licenses) and ruby (40 licenses).
- Copper appears in 13 licenses (12.1% of the total).
- Nickel appears in 11 licenses (10.3% of the total).
- Other critical minerals such as vanadium, titanium, zircon, rutile and uranium complete the picture of licensed strategic resources in the province.
These numbers alone would be enough to raise questions about the trajectory of mining licensing in Cabo Delgado. But it is when you analyze who holds these licenses that the data becomes truly revealing.
| Ordem | Nome da empresa | Nº da Licença | Tipo de Minério | Apresentação | Concessão |
| 1 | Nicolas Mining II – Sociedade Unipessoal, Lda | 10217 L | Ouro e Minerais Associados | 29/11/2019 | 30/04/2025 |
| 2 | Mpelezi, Lda | 12752 L | Areias Pesadas | 16/08/2024 | 2/5/2025 |
| 3 | Arbi Mussa; Transporte e Comércio Arbi Mussa – Sociedade Unipessoal, Lda | 8270 L | Grafite, Minerais Associados | 18/07/2016 | 5/5/2025 |
| 4 | Huaxin Mining Exploration Co – Sociedade Unipessoal, Lda | 11681 L | Areias Pesadas, Rútilo, Titânio, Zircão | 4/9/2023 | 13/05/2025 |
| 5 | Minerais do Índico, Lda | 12719 L | Água-Marinha, Granadas, Minerais Associados, Ouro, Rubi, Safira, Turmalina | 19/07/2024 | 5/5/2025 |
| 6 | Mineral Stream, Lda | 5438 L | Grafite | 18/05/2012 | 18/04/2025 |
| 7 | Chinyere Resources Mining III, Lda | 11639 L | Grafite | 18/08/2023 | 2/5/2025 |
| 8 | Mineral Stream, Lda | 5445 L | Grafite | 21/05/2012 | 24/04/2025 |
| 9 | Sucess Investment, Lda | 9553 L | Grafite | 27/07/2018 | 17/04/2025 |
| 10 | Kukhela Mining IX, Lda | 12442 L | Chumbo, Grafite, Minerais Associados, Ouro, Quartzo, Rubi, Zinco | 12/3/2024 | 8/5/2025 |
| 11 | Gems Way, Lda | 8569 L | Ouro e Minerais Associados, Pedras Preciosas | 7/3/2017 | 27/06/2025 |
| 12 | J5 Mining Resources, Lda | 11560 L | Grafite, Minerais Associados, Ouro, Rubi | 19/05/2023 | 27/05/2025 |
| 13 | Africa Gold Holding – Sociedade Unipessoal, Lda | 10767 L | Corindo, Esmeralda, Grafite, Minerais Associados, Quartzo, Rubi, Turmalina | 26/08/2021 | 25/04/2025 |
| 14 | Leben, Lda | 10173 L | Minerais Associados, Ouro, Rubi | 25/11/2019 | 30/04/2025 |
| 15 | Runstane, Lda | 11801 L | Minerais Associados, Ouro | 20/11/2023 | 25/04/2025 |
| 16 | Kangol Mines, Lda | 10522 L | Ouro e Minerais Associados | 10/12/2020 | 29/04/2025 |
| 17 | Goldenminds, Lda | 12484 L | Ouro e Minerais Associados | 20/03/2024 | 30/04/2025 |
| 18 | Parruque Building Stone, Lda | 8958 L | Minerais Associados, Rubi | 22/08/2017 | 28/04/2025 |
| 19 | Olelon Mining, S.A | 12626 L | Ouro e Minerais Associados | 16/05/2024 | 2/5/2025 |
| 20 | Amazano Minas – Sociedade Unipessoal, Lda | 9827 L | Corindo, Granadas, Minerais Associados, Rubi | 30/11/2018 | 25/04/2025 |
| 21 | Clay Mining Tech – Sociedade Unipessoal, Lda | 10339 L | Ouro e Minerais Associados | 18/05/2020 | 24/06/2025 |
| 22 | Namahaca Ruby Mining, Lda | 10305 L | Ouro e Minerais Associados | 23/04/2020 | 8/5/2025 |
| 23 | Associação dos Deficientes Militares e Paramilitares de Moçambique (ADEMIMO) | 8846 L | Ágatas, Água-Marinha, Esmeralda, Minerais Associados, Ouro, Quartzo, rubi, Safira, Turmalina | 12/6/2017 | 13/05/2025 |
| 24 | Parruque Building Stone, Lda | 8959 L | Ouro e Minerais Associados | 23/08/2017 | 8/5/2025 |
| 25 | Soulstone, Lda | 12639 L | Ouro e Minerais Associados | 30/05/2024 | 29/04/2025 |
| 26 | Celme Holding Rock VI, S.A | 8940 L | Corindo, grafite, Minerais Associados, Rubi | 4/8/2017 | 13/05/2025 |
| 27 | Uakulela Minerais, Lda | 12622 L | Minerais Associados, Ouro, Rubi | 16/05/2024 | 6/5/2025 |
| 28 | Pathfinder Moçambique G, S.A | 10660 L | Grafite, Metais Preciosos | 14/05/2021 | 30/04/2025 |
| 29 | NC Minerals, Lda | 10041 L | Mármores, Minerais Associados | 18/07/2019 | 30/05/2025 |
| 30 | Sucess Investment – 4, Lda | 9658 L | Mármores | 21/09/2018 | 24/06/2025 |
| 31 | Namuli Mining Development, Lda | 11544 L | Grafite | 10/5/2023 | 29/04/2025 |
| 32 | Bengala Mining, Lda | 8492 L | Cobre, Ferro, Ouro, Rubi | 30/11/2016 | 8/5/2025 |
| 33 | Focus Mining & Investimentos, Lda | 7025 L | Água-Marinha, Rubi, Turmalina | 28/03/2014 | 19/05/2025 |
| 34 | Bengala Mining, Lda | 8434 L | Minerais Associados, Urânio | 9/11/2016 | 2/5/2025 |
| 35 | Nicolas Mining IV – Sociedade Unipessoal, Lda | 10354 L | Grafite, Minerais Preciosos | 18/06/2020 | 7/5/2025 |
| 36 | Management Consultant, S.A | 10127 L | Grafite, Minerais Associados | 10/10/2019 | 3/3/2025 |
| 37 | Sino Mining Área 3, Lda | 9797 L | Grafite | 28/11/2018 | 25/04/2025 |
| 38 | Geoide Consultoria, Lda | 6360 L | Antimónio, Chumbo, Grafite, Níquel, Ouro, Vanádio, Zinco | 31/05/2013 | 20/05/2025 |
| 39 | EME Investimentos, S.A | 8094 L | Grafite, Metais Básicos | 10/2/2016 | 2/5/2025 |
| 40 | Mutarara Resources, Lda | 7598 L | Rubi | 8/5/2015 | 21/04/2025 |
| 41 | SVS Moçambique, Lda | 7416 L | Minerais Associados, Rubi | 10/2/2015 | 18/04/2025 |
| 42 | Frontiers, lda | 8989 L | Cassiterite, Ilmenite, Magnetite, Monazite, Ouro, Pedras Preciosas, Pedras semipreciosas, Rútilo, Zircão | 15/09/2017 | 24/04/2025 |
| 43 | Frontiers, lda | 8960 L | Areia de Construção, Pedra de Construção | 25/08/2017 | 14/05/2025 |
| 44 | Real Investimentos, S.A | 8195 L | Cobre | 4/5/2016 | 23/04/2025 |
| 45 | Meluco Mining, S.A | 9305 L | Corindo, Minerais Associados, Rubi, Turmalina | 2/5/2018 | 24/04/2025 |
| 46 | Wealth Mining, Lda | 9482 L | Mármores | 29/06/2018 | 29/04/2025 |
| 47 | Michael Construções, Lda | 10094 L | Grafite, Mármores, Metais Básicos, Ouro | 9/9/2019 | 28/04/2025 |
| 48 | Rella Comercial, Lda | 11018 L | Chumbo, Grafite, Minerais associados, Ouro, Quartzo, Rubi, Zinco | 26/05/2022 | 25/04/2025 |
| 49 | Meluco Mining, S.A | 9303 L | Água-marinha, Corindo, Rubi, Turmalina | 2/5/2018 | 25/04/2025 |
| 50 | Lukas’s, Lda | 7115 L | Ouro | 27/11/2014 | 18/04/2025 |
| 51 | Derre Construções, Lda | 11016 L | Chumbo, Grafite, Minerais associados, Ouro, Quartzo, Rubi, Zinco | 25/05/2022 | 5/5/2025 |
| 52 | Nakulo Mining – Sociedade Unipessoal, Lda | 10335 L | Grafite, Minerais Associados | 13/05/2020 | 5/5/2025 |
| 53 | NC Minerals, Lda | 9975 L | Chumbo, Cobre, Grafite, Minerais Associados, Níquel, Ouro, Paládio, Rubi, Zinco | 29/04/2029 | 25/04/2025 |
| 54 | NC Minerals, Lda | 9973 L | Chumbo, Cobre, Grafite, Minerais Associados, Níquel, Ouro, Paládio, Rubi, Zinco | 29/04/2019 | 24/04/2025 |
| 55 | NC Minerals, Lda | 9976 L | Chumbo, Cobre, Grafite, Minerais Associados, Níquel, Ouro, Paládio, Rubi, Zinco | 29/04/2019 | 30/05/2025 |
| 56 | Munisse e Filhos, Serviços de Mineração, Lda | 7353 L | Calcário | 8/1/2015 | 18/04/2025 |
| 57 | Comal – Companhia de Madeira, Lda | 7839 L | Chumbo, Cobre, Minerais Associados, Níquel, Ouro, Platina, Zinco | 5/8/2015 | 21/04/2025 |
| 58 | Meluco Mining, S.A | 9306 L | Água-marinha, Corindo, Grafite, rubi, Turmalina | 2/5/2018 | 25/04/2025 |
| 59 | NC Minerals 48, Lda | 9742 L | Grafite, Minerais Associados | 9/11/2018 | 24/04/2025 |
| 60 | Yuanbo Investimentos de Energia Internacional, Lda | 9612 L | Grafite, Minerais Associados, Ouro | 29/08/2018 | 23/04/2025 |
| 61 | NC Minerals, Lda | 9977 L | Chumbo, Cobre, Grafite, Minerais Associados, Níquel, Platina, Prata, Rubi | 29/04/2019 | 24/04/2025 |
| 62 | NC Minerals, Lda | 9974 L | Chumbo, Cobre, Grafite, Minerais Associados, Níquel, Platina, Prata, Rubi | 29/04/2019 | 30/04/2025 |
| 63 | Comal – Companhia de Madeira, Lda | 8601 L | Chumbo, Cobre, Minerais Associados, Níquel, Ouro, Paládio, Platina, Zinco | 14/03/2017 | 22/04/2025 |
| 64 | Comal – Companhia de Madeira, Lda | 7839 L | Chumbo, Cobre, Minerais Associados, Níquel, Ouro, Platina, Zinco | 5/8/2015 | 21/04/2025 |
| 65 | Meluco Mining, S.A | 9304 L | Água-marinha, Corindo, Rubi, Turmalina | 2/5/2018 | 28/04/2025 |
| 66 | Ossanzaya Empreendimento, Lda | 12711 L | Grafite, Minerais Associados | 16/07/2024 | 19/02/2025 |
| 67 | Masiku Mining II, Lda | 11278 L | Cobre, Grafite, Níquel, Ouro, rubi, Urânio | 7/12/2022 | 30/04/2025 |
| 68 | Raras e Preciosas, Lda | 7138 L | Rubi | 1/12/2014 | 18/04/2025 |
| 69 | Mnumandra Construção, Exploração de Minerais e Agricultura, Comercio e Pesquisa, Lda | 8685 L | Minerais Associados, Ouro | 4/4/2017 | 21/04/2025 |
| 70 | Flomining, S.A | 9473 L | Grafite | 20/06/2018 | 29/04/2025 |
| 71 | Conceitos Mining, Lda | 9219 L | Água-marinha, Minerais Semipreciosos, Rubi, Turmalina | 9/4/2018 | 25/04/2025 |
| 72 | Comal – Companhia de Madeira, Lda | 8600 L | Chumbo, Cobre, Minerais Associados, Níquel, Ouro, Paládio, Platina, Zinco | 14/03/2017 | 22/04/22025 |
| 73 | Someq, Lda | 8840 L | Calcário | 5/6/2017 | 20/06/2025 |
| 74 | Mozambique Heavysand Company J, Lda | 11221 L | Grafite, Minerais Associados | 15/11/2022 | 30/04/2025 |
| 75 | Rita Resources, Lda | 10246 L | Grafite, Minerais Associados | 4/3/2020 | 29/04/2025 |
| 76 | J Chana Moz Research Exploration Oil & Gas Company, Lda | 8620 L | Água-marinha, Esmeralda, Minerais Associados, Ouro, Turmalina | 16/03/2017 | 22/04/2025 |
| 77 | Mozambique Heavysand Company B, Lda | 8452 L | Grafite | 21/11/2016 | 30/04/2025 |
| 78 | Minxone, Lda | 11498 L | Ouro e Minerais Associados | 20/04/2023 | 28/04/2025 |
| 79 | Real Investimentos, S.A | 8219 L | Cobre | 3/6/2016 | 29/04/2025 |
| 80 | Junren International Mining Mozambique – 2, Lda | 12763 L | Grafite, Granadas, Minerais Associados, Quartzo, Rubi, Vanádio | 19/08/2024 | 8/5/2025 |
| 81 | Bengala Minas, Lda | 7769 L | Grafite, Minerais Associados | 9/7/2015 | 22/04/2025 |
| 82 | NC Minerals, Lda | 9738 L | Grafite, Minerais Associados | 9/11/2018 | 28/04/2025 |
| 83 | Dinâmica Investimentos, Lda | 9180 L | Minerais Associados, Turmalina | 2/4/2018 | 23/04/2025 |
| 84 | Busolwa Mining II – Sociedade Unipessoal, Lda | 12475 L | Ouro e Minerais Associados | 13/03/2024 | 5/5/2025 |
| 85 | Sogema Serviços, Lda | 11524 L | Água-marinha, Grafite, Granadas, Metais Básicos, Minerais do Grupo de Platina, Ouro, Rubi, Safira, Turmalina | 4/5/2023 | 5/5/2025 |
| 86 | North Resources, Lda | 11563 L | Grafite, Minerais Associados | 22/05/2023 | 16/05/2025 |
| 87 | Earthcon Resources V, Lda | 11473 L | Água-marinha, Grafite, Granadas, Metais Básicos, Minerais do Grupo de Platina, Ouro, Rubi, Safira | 5/4/2023 | 5/5/2025 |
| 88 | Rubis de Moçambique | 9119 L | Grafite, Metais Básicos, Rubi | 17/11/2017 | 23/04/2025 |
| 89 | Longo Yuan International Investment – Sociedade Unipessoal, Lda | 8945 L | Ouro e Minerais Associados | 9/8/2017 | 28/04/2025 |
| 90 | Chidima Mining IV – Sociedade Unipessoal, Lda | 11634 L | Grafite, Minerais Associados | 17/08/2023 | 27/05/2025 |
| 91 | Top Map, Serviço de Consultoria e Geociência, Lda | 8551 L | Ouro e Minerais Associados | 3/3/2017 | 21/04/2025 |
| 92 | Busolwa Mining, Lda | 11841 L | Ouro e Minerais Associados | 12/12/2023 | 25/04/2025 |
| 93 | Maria Ruby Gems & Jewelery, Lda | 8702 L | Minerais Associados, Ouro, Rubi | 12/4/2017 | 12/5/2025 |
| 94 | Alstones, Lda | 7439 L | Grafite, Minerais Associados, Rubi | 23/02/2015 | 2/6/2025 |
| 95 | Mafla Holding, Lda | 8307 L | Água-marinha, Granadas, Minerais Associados, Morganite, Ouro, Rubi, Topázio, Turmalina | 11/8/2016 | 30/04/2025 |
| 96 | GPS Mining Company, Lda | 9276 L | Água-marinha, Grafite, Granadas, Minerais Associados, Ouro, Rubi, Safira, Turmalina | 25/04/2018 | 13/05/2025 |
| 97 | Sibonguile Holding, Lda | 12602 L | Minerais Associados, Rubi | 29/04/2024 | 5/5/2025 |
| 98 | Real Investimento XX, Lda | 7629 L | Ferro | 20/05/2015 | 6/5/2025 |
| 99 | Bengala Minas, Lda | 7686 L | Água-marinha, Esmeralda, Metais Básicos, Ouro, Rubi, Safira, Turmalina | 5/6/2015 | 9/5/2025 |
| 100 | Bengala Minas, Lda | 7688 L | Água-marinha, Esmeralda, Metais Básicos, Ouro, Rubi, Safira, Turmalina | 5/6/2015 | 25/04/2025 |
| 101 | Real Investimentos, S.A | 8200 L | Ferro, Minerais Associados | 17/05/2016 | 29/04/2025 |
| 102 | Canaanita 3, Lda | 13365 L | Gesso | 12/12/2024 | 5/5/2025 |
| 103 | Sem Nome | 7695 L | Calcário | 9/6/2015 | 15/05/2025 |
| 104 | Hua Ouro Recurso, Lda | 10141 L | Areias Pesadas, Rutilo, Titânio, Zircão | 25/10/2019 | 8/5/2025 |
| 105 | Tarita Resources, Lda | 8638 L | Rubi | 23/03/2017 | 29/04/2025 |
| 106 | Rodofa Consultoria – Sociedade Unipessoal, Lda | 11586 L | Grafite, Minerais Associados | 1/6/2023 | 25/04/2025 |
| 107 | Nicolas Mining II – Sociedade Unipessoal, Lda | 10217 L | Ouro e Minerais Associados | 29/11/2019 | 30/04/2025 |
Source: Mozambique Mining Cadastre Map Portal
- Who Controls Critical Minerals? The dissected Chinese presence
The identification of companies with Chinese participation, whether fully Chinese or mixed Mozambican-Chinese, in the licensing database reveals a concentration that goes far beyond what the names of the companies might suggest at first glance.
11 companies with direct or significant Chinese participation were identified, which jointly hold 20 active licenses in Cabo Delgado, representing 18.7% of the total licenses in force in the province. These companies are divided into two main groups:
- Companies with 100% Chinese capital:
- Yuanbo Investimentos de Energia Internacional, Lda (License 9612 L) – Graphite, Associated Minerals and Gold. The very name of the company, “Energia Internacional” leaves no doubt about the strategic framework of the investment;
- Mozambique Heavysand Company J, Lda (License 11221 L) — Graphite and Associated Minerals;
- Mozambique Heavysand Company B, Lda (License 8452 L) – exclusive focus on Graphite;
- Junren International Mining Mozambique – 2, Lda (License 12763 L) – Graphite, Vanadium, Garnets and Associated Minerals. The graphite-vanadium combination is particularly significant from a strategic point of view;
- Huaxin Mining Exploration Co – Sociedade Unipessoal, Lda (License 11681 L) – Heavy Sands, Rutile, Titanium and Zircon;
- Hua Ouro Recurso, Lda (License 10141 L) – Heavy Sands, Rutile, Titanium and Zircon;
- Longo Yuan International Investment – Sociedade Unipessoal, Lda (License 8945 L) – Gold and Associated Minerals;
- Masiku Mining II, Lda (License 11278 L) – Copper, Graphite, Nickel, Gold, Ruby and Uranium. This company is 100% owned by a Chinese national and features the most diversified critical minerals portfolio on the entire list;
- Mozambican-Chinese mixed capital companies:
- Sino Mining Area 3, Lda (License 9797 L) – exclusive focus on Graphite;
- NC Minerals, Lda – holds 8 active licenses (9975 L, 9973 L, 9976 L, 9977 L, 9974 L, 9738 L, 10041 L, License 9742 L), all of them covering combinations of Graphite, Copper, Nickel, Palladium and Platinum. It is by far the company with the highest number of active licenses in the entire database;
- Comal – Companhia de Madeira, Lda – holds 3 active licenses (7839 L, 8601 L, 8600 L) focused on Copper, Nickel, Platinum and Palladium.
The fact that companies such as Sino Mining, NC Minerals and Comal use names that do not immediately reveal their shareholder composition is in itself worthy of attention. In a province where the extraction of critical minerals has direct geopolitical implications, transparency about the origin of capital should be a minimum requirement of the regulatory framework.
- The Numbers No One Presented in Beijing
When you aggregate the analysis and calculate the percentages of Chinese control over each critical mineral individually, three numbers emerge that should have been at the center of public debate before, during, and after the presidential visit to China:
Graphite: Of the 45 active licenses that include graphite in Cabo Delgado, 14 belong to companies with Chinese participation. This represents 31.1% of all the province’s graffiti licenses already in Chinese or Sino-Mozambican hands.
Nickel: Of the 11 active licenses that include nickel in Cabo Delgado, all 11 licenses, 100% have Chinese participation. There is not a single nickel license in Cabo Delgado that does not involve Chinese capital or citizens.
Copper: Of the 13 active licenses that include copper, 11 have Chinese participation, which represents 84.6% of the total.
These are official data, recorded in the licenses in force issued by the Mozambican State. These are not projections, they are not estimates, they are not analysts’ speculations. These are administrative facts that appear in the public records of mining concessions.
The question that arises is simple: if 100% of Cabo Delgado’s nickel and 84.6% of copper were already licensed to entities with Chinese participation, what exactly was “invited” to come during Chapo’s visit to Beijing?
- The Anatomy of Control: How to Build a Strategic Position
It is important to understand that the Chinese presence in Cabo Delgado’s mining licensing is not the result of chance or a market coincidence. It is the result of a deliberate, methodical and long-term strategy that China has applied in multiple African countries with mineral wealth relevant to its energy transition agenda and technological leadership.
China currently controls about 70% of global rare earth production (Balbiéri and Balza, 04/05/2026) and dominates processing chains of critical minerals such as cobalt (Democratic Republic of Congo), lithium (South American triangle) and graphite (where Mozambique is one of the priority targets). The strategy combines three vectors: early licensing in countries with less stringent regulatory frameworks, the creation of local companies with names that do not reveal the origin of the capital, and the use of joint ventures to ensure privileged access to local political and administrative networks.
In Cabo Delgado, this strategy is visible in the data. Note, for example, that Yuanbo Energy Investments International – whose name already contains a statement of strategic intent, applied for its graphite license in August 2018, several years before any formal diplomatic rapprochement between Chapo and Beijing. Mozambique Heavysand Company B applied for its graphite license in November 2016. Sino Mining Area 3, in November 2018. NC Minerals applications for the eight licenses were between 2018 and 2019, systematically covering graphite, copper and nickel simultaneously.
All this happened silently, over the years, without headlines, without summits, without speeches about “fraternal ties between the peoples of Mozambique and China”. It happened through administrative records, license applications, approvals that the Mozambican state was granting, apparently without an integrated strategic vision of what was being ceded and to whom.
Beijing’s invitation in April 2026 was the visible culmination of a process that was already largely consummated behind the scenes.
- Chapo’s Visit to China: Diplomacy or Formalization?
Daniel Chapo’s state visit to China, from 17 to 22 April 2026, was widely reported as a moment of opening, of new impetus in bilateral relations, of “a new phase of economic cooperation based on concrete investments, strategic partnerships and measurable results”, to use the words of the President himself. The agreements signed covered defence cooperation, large-scale geological mapping, industrial investment and, crucially, the mining sector.
The joint statement resulting from the visit spoke of “critical minerals essential for the global transition to green energy”, Chinese commitments to “a comprehensive approach that combines resource assessment with the development of local infrastructure”, and strengthening security in northern Mozambique as a “protective layer for the long-term investments” that Beijing is applying in the region.
Read in the light of the licensing data, this press release acquires a very different meaning from what its diplomatic language suggests. When China talks about “large-scale geological mapping” in Mozambique, and particularly Cabo Delgado, it is talking about a region where its companies already hold 31% of graphite licenses, 100% of nickel and 84.6% of copper licenses. When you talk about “resource assessment”, you are talking about resources that your companies are already prospecting. When you talk about “security” to protect investments, you are talking about investments that already exist, are already licensed, are already on the ground.
Chapo’s visit to China did not open a new chapter. It formalized and gave high-level diplomatic cover to a chapter that had already been written, page by page, license by license, since at least 2016.
This distinction is not merely semantic. It has profound implications for how Mozambican citizens, political analysts, civil society, and Mozambique’s international partners should read the relationship between the two countries. It is one thing for a President to negotiate the conditions for the entry of a new partner. Another, very different, is a President who will publicly legitimize a presence that was already installed and whose conditions, benefits for Mozambique and safeguards for national sovereignty remain largely opaque.
- The Problem of Transparency and Sovereignty over Resources
The analysis of the data raises an issue that goes far beyond the geopolitics of Sino-Mozambican relations: the issue of transparency in mining licensing and Mozambique’s effective sovereignty over its natural resources.
The first problem is the opacity in the shareholder composition of licensed companies. As demonstrated in the cases of NC Minerals and Comal and others, companies with names that do not disclose the origin of the capital may hold licenses on critical minerals of enormous strategic and economic value. The Mozambican regulatory framework does not require, in a systematic and public manner, the identification of the beneficial owners of mining concessions, mostly registered abroad and in the form of a public limited company (S.A). This gap is not just a problem of transparency, it is a structural vulnerability that allows large-scale foreign interests to operate without the state, civil society or affected citizens having full visibility over who exploits the national subsoil.
The second problem is the absence of an integrated licensing strategy for critical minerals. The data shows that graphite, nickel and copper licenses have been issued over the years, apparently without a strategic framework that defined concentration limits by nationality, local processing requirements, or benefit-sharing mechanisms with Cabo Delgado communities. The result is that, when the President goes to Beijing to “invite” Chinese investors, the market was already largely captured by these same investors, without Mozambique having negotiated the conditions of this capture in a position of strength.
The third problem is the asymmetry of information between Mozambique and China. Chinese companies operating in Cabo Delgado do so within the framework of a coordinated Chinese national strategy, which includes geological mapping, market intelligence, diplomatic and financial support from the Chinese state. Mozambique, on the other hand, licenses individually, company by company, mineral by mineral, without there being, at least publicly, an integrated view of who is acquiring what, in what proportion, and with what implications for national sovereignty in the long term.
This asymmetry was clearly visible in the April 2026 visit: while the Chinese delegation arrived with detailed proposals, pre-drafted agreements, and a clear agenda focused on specific resources, the Mozambican delegation presented a posture of “openness” and “resource mobilization” that, considering the licensing data, sounds more like validation than negotiation.
- What Mozambique Gains and What It Stands to Lose
It would be unfair, and intellectually dishonest, to ignore the potential benefits of Sino-Mozambican cooperation in the mining sector. China has investment capacity, extraction and processing technology, and access to markets that Mozambique, on its own, would hardly be able to mobilize. In a context in which the Mozambican economy is experiencing significant fiscal pressure, with a debt to China that amounted to more than US$1.3 billion at the end of 2025, direct investment in the productive sector can be seen as a lever for growth.
But the question is not whether China should invest in Mozambique. The question is under what conditions, with what guarantees for Mozambique, and with what level of transparency and public scrutiny this investment is made.
The history of natural resource exploitation in Africa is littered with examples where the inflow of foreign capital without adequate safeguards has resulted in economic enclave: wealth is extracted, exported, and processed abroad, while local communities are left with environmental impacts, social instability, and a minimal share of the benefits. Cabo Delgado, already weakened by years of armed conflict and population displacement, is particularly vulnerable to this model.
The agreements signed in Beijing speak of “local infrastructure development” and an “approach that combines resource assessment with local industrialization.” But these commitments are, for the time being, declarations of intent. What exists concretely, documented and verifiable, are 20 active licenses in Chinese or Sino-Mozambican hands, covering 100% of the nickel and 84.6% of the copper in the province, without the Mozambican public knowing, precisely, what royalties have been negotiated, what are the local employment commitments, what are the requirements for transformation in national territory, and what are the inspection and accountability mechanisms.
Sovereignty over natural resources is not measured only by the formal ownership of licenses. It is measured by the effective capacity of the State to impose conditions, monitor compliance, capture value and redistribute it for the benefit of the population. And this substantive sovereignty is difficult to exercise when the negotiating position of the State has been, over the years, being granted license by license, without a visible strategy and without public debate.
- The Geopolitics of Minerals and the Place of Mozambique
The global context in which all this occurs is one of unprecedented geopolitical competition for control of critical mineral supply chains. The United States, the European Union, Japan, Australia and other Western countries have woken up in recent years to the risk of dependence on China for access to these minerals and have launched initiatives to diversify their sources of supply, which includes looking at Mozambique with growing interest.
The American stake in the Calama district graphite mine in Cabo Delgado through the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation is a clear sign of this interest. Europe, with its Critical Raw Materials Strategy approved in 2023 (Direção-Geral de Economia, 20/03/2023), is also actively seeking partnerships with African countries rich in strategic minerals. Mozambique is therefore at the epicenter of a geopolitical competition in which both China and the West have an interest in securing positions.
This position could be a huge advantage for Mozambique, if the country knew how to take advantage of it. A state that negotiates with multiple partners simultaneously, that sets clear conditions and applies them consistently, that requires local processing and technology transfer, can transform its mineral wealth into genuine development. A state that goes to Beijing to legitimize a presence that is already installed, without having negotiated conditions in a position of strength, risks losing this window of opportunity.
The current moment with China already strongly positioned in Cabo Delgado’s critical minerals and the West looking for alternatives is, paradoxically, a moment of power for Mozambique, if it is used with strategic intelligence. But using this power requires, first, recognizing the real state of affairs: and the real state of affairs is that 100% of the nickel licenses and 85% of the copper licenses are already in the hands of Chinese participation.
To acknowledge this is not to be anti-China. It is to be pro-Mozambique.
Conclusion
There is a phrase that circulates in the media of African geopolitical analysis and that is applied with surgical precision to the case in question: “The most important agreements are not those signed at summits. They are the ones that are signed in secretariats.”
Mining licensing data in force in Cabo Delgado show that, with regard to the Chinese presence in the province’s critical minerals, the agreements of the secretariats preceded the agreements of the presidential palaces by years. When Daniel Chapo landed in Beijing in April 2026 to talk about mining, cooperation and development, Chinese and Sino-Mozambican companies already held 31% of the graphite, 100% nickel and 84.6% copper licenses in Cabo Delgado. They were already on the ground, they were already prospecting, they were already preparing what will come next.
The visit was important, all high-level diplomacy has its value. But it did not represent an opening. It represented a formalization. And there is a fundamental difference between the two things.
An opening presupposes negotiation of conditions, evaluation of alternatives, exercise of bargaining power. A formalization presupposes recognizing what already exists and giving it the seal of diplomatic protocol. Mozambique was, in this case, doing the second thing, without the public debate, the Assembly of the Republic, civil society or the communities of Cabo Delgado having been properly informed and involved in the process.
The title of this article – Mining Bonds Before the Agreements, is not a provocation. It is a factual description of the sequence of events. The licenses were first. The agreements came later. And between the two things, there is a question that Mozambique has not yet answered with sufficient clarity: what concrete, measurable and binding counterparts has the country obtained in exchange for access to its subsoil?
If this question is not given a public, transparent and verifiable answer, the “invitation” narrative will remain more of a beautiful story than a development policy. And Cabo Delgado, its graphite, its nickel, its copper, its future deserves much more than beautiful stories.
References
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